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Abstract 
  How can a principal (an agent) ensure that an agent (a principal) will work (pay up), if 
payment (work) precedes work (payment)? When a banknote is torn in two, each part is by 
itself worthless. A principal can pre-commit to payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote 
and giving the agent the first half as “prepayment”; the agent receives the completing half 
upon  delivery  of  the  service.  This  contract  design  is  known  as  “indenture”.  It  is  self-
enforcing  and  incentive-compatible.  This  paper  experimentally  tests  the  efficacy  of  the 
“indenture game” and its implications for cooperation in one-shot environments. We find 
that cooperation rates are high and stable over time. Its efficacy is moderated by expected 
losses due to the existence of uncooperative types. 
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§ and Jonathan H.W. Tan 
 
1.  Introduction 
When a principal (an agent) incurs cost (effort) in exchange for an agent’s (a principal’s) work 
(payment), there is a conflict of interests, and potentially leads to moral hazard (shirking). An 
effective contract must serve both principal and agent (and better, society). It binds the contracted 
parties to honor the agreed terms-of-trade. Besides preventing moral hazard, its administration 
cost should ideally be as low as possible. This paper presents an experimental test of a candidate 
contract, and explores its efficacy and limitations. The following background motivates its design. 
The diversity of contracts can be classified under: i) contracts enforced by third parties, and ii) 
contracts that are self-enforced by the contracting parties. Third-party enforcement is typically 
costly, such as when legal costs are involved. The third-party may be an individual, group (e.g. 
legal administrators), or the effect of manipulated market conditions. For instance, in Shapiro and 
Stiglitz’s (1986) macroeconomic model, employers pay “efficiency wages” above the equilibrium 
wage. This creates costly unemployment – a threat forcing employees to “not shirk” (i.e., the non-
shirking constraint). A large literature on mechanism design shows us how incentive contracts can 
govern  self-interested  individuals,  with  conflicting  interests,  to  complete  successful  economic 
transactions. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) provide a wonderful survey.
1 
The  efficacy  of  a  contract  can  be  limited  by  several  factors;  we  mention  a  few.  First,  a 
successful contract requires contracting parties to mutually agree on the contract’s objectives and 
rewards, while providing for all possible contingencies. While in practice no contract can cover all 
contingencies (Williamson, 1985), the dangerous cocktail of boundedly rational individuals (with 
imperfect  foresight)  with  conflicting  interests  can  result  in  delays  to  agreement,  impasses,  or 
worse  still  disagreement.  Next,  self-enforced  contracts  that  rely  on  extrinsic  incentives  (i.e. 
monetary payoffs) to induce “cooperation” may potentially diminish the intrinsic incentives (e.g. 
trust and reciprocity) to voluntarily cooperate (Frey, 1997; Bénabou and Tirole, 1999).
2 
Alternatively,  one  could  consider  using  contracts  of  a  polar  opposite  nature  of  complete 
contracts:  explicit  contracts  based  purely  on  trust  and  reciprocity  (e.g.,  Fehr  et  al.,  1997; 
Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2004; for formal models of reciprocity, see Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg 
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1 For seminal papers see, e.g. Holmström (1979) Grossman and Hart (1983) and Laffont and Tirole (1988). 
2 Experimental evidence indicates that extrinsic incentives may substitute rather than complement intrinsic motivation 
(Falk, et al., 1999), or may even lead to a crowding out of voluntary cooperation (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Fehr 
and Gächter, 2000).    3 
and Kirchsteiger, 1998; Falk and Fischbacher, 1999).
3 While explicit contracts have proven to be 
reliable in certain contexts, such as the one investigated by Fehr et al. (1997), the same result 
might not always hold. Consider the investment game by Berg et al. (1995), where the truster can 
invest trust in the trustee by sending money – which triples in value – to the trustee, and the trustee 
can reciprocate by sending money back to the truster. This game is a two-stage version of the 
Rosenthal’s (1982) famous centipede game.
4 While Berg et al. show us that trust and reciprocity 
can  induce  considerable  levels  of  cooperation  even  when  the  predicted  subgame-perfect 
equilibrium is to defect, the stability of contracts based on such relations is suspect over time: 
convergence to non-cooperation is expected if such games are played repeatedly (Zauner, 1999).
 5  
The Indenture Game (IG) proposed by Kritikos and Bolle (1998) is an example of a self-
enforced  contract,  incentive-compatible  in  a  one-shot  environment  (where  reputation  does  not 
count). The IG attempts to combine the low costs of self-enforcement, reliability of incentive-
compatibility, and intrinsic motivations of trust and reciprocity. In the IG, the principal transfers 
the first half (of an indentured, i.e. torn, banknote) to the agent. The agent then decides whether to 
exert effort. The principal can then complete the transaction by sending the completing half (the 
other half of the indentured banknote). Kritikos and Bolle theoretically show that amongst the 
multiple equilibria, cooperation is a mutual best reply for principal and agent and that ‘Forward 
induction’ (as defined by van Damme, 1989) selects it as the unique stable equilibrium.  
The central feature of this scheme is as such. Offering the first half of an indenture allows a 
principal to strategically pre-commit to payment-upon-delivery. A principal who sends a hostage 
to an agent, in effect, sends a signal of his intention to cooperate (honor his debt). A principal can 
also perceive his indenture as an investment of trust, following the reasoning of Berg et al.’s 
(1995) trust game.
6 Agents know this and accept contracts; in effect they  naturally self-select 
themselves into performing the task. As with the trust game, an agent may perceive the fulfillment 
of tasks as reciprocity to the principal for the trust invested in him. At the final stage of the game, 
the principal is indifferent between transferring and retaining the second half of the indentured 
banknote,  thus  able  to  reward  the  agent’s  trustworthiness  without  having  to  sacrifice  any 
additional material payoff. In other words, “cooperative” principals are naturally self-selected into 
eventual compliance with the contract. In this sense it aligns the pecuniary interests of players; 
how  these  interests  are  aligned  conforms  to  a  game  structure  that  can  also  induce  behavior 
motivated by concerns for trust and reciprocity. As a consequence, the willingness for voluntary 
cooperation of reciprocal types is not destroyed while, at the same time, selfish players have 
sufficient incentives to cooperate.  
                                                 
3 For a first model based on voluntary cooperation instead of incentives, cf. Holmström and Milgrom (1991). 
4 See Fehr et al. (1993, 1997), Güth et al. (1998), and Fehr and Falk (1999). This approach underlies the concept of 
relational contracts, where the principal-agent relationship is characterized by adapting tasks and rewards to each 
given scenario that arises during the trade. See Levin (2003) for restrictions of relational contracts. 
5 See e.g. Bolle and Ockenfels (1990) and Güth et al. (1997) for two-stage dilemmas. There is recent research on the 
centipede game with more than three stages (e.g. Fey et al., 1996; McCabe et al., 1998, or; Zauner, 1999).  
6 For similar interpretations of other similar games, see also Jacobsen and Sadrieh (1996), Bolle (1998), Fahr and 
Irlenbusch (2000), e.g. Charness (2002) Fehr et al. (1997) (“gift exchange game”), Abbink et al. (2000), for the 
“moonlight game” and for other specifically designed extensive form games with similar observations of reciprocally 
behaving subjects, see e.g. Offerman (1998) and Charness and Rabin (2000).    4 
The method of indenture can potentially be applied to real-world situations. For example, 
Kritikos and Bolle (1998) offer the example of investing in a trainee manager with training (i.e., 
the  first  half  of  indentured  banknote)  and  a  positive  reference  letter  (the  completing  half  of 
indentured banknote) in exchange for a minimum term of work (effort). It is important to test its 
efficacy,  and  to  further  understand  the  method  and  its  limitations  –  if  theory  and  empirical 
evidence is at variance. Laboratory experimentation allows us to test policy recommendations ex 
ante at low costs, relative to the ex post costs involved in natural experiments. Our paper does so. 
Our  results  show  that,  overall,  indenture  is  effective.  Its  efficacy  is  moderated  by  the 
willingness  of  principals  and  agents  to  enter  into  contracts.  This  willingness  depends  on  the 
expected gains from cooperation, and the degree of a/symmetry in the respective profit margins 
for  principal  and  agent  (elaborated  below).  Mean  cooperation  rates  are  stable  across  time. 
Principals’ actions are sensitive to the experiences of previous outcomes from indenture. Agents 
are sensitive to their beliefs of the “type” of principal they are playing with. The IG performs 
significantly better over time, relative to the “natural cooperation” benchmark in a simple (three-
stage)  control  game  with  the  option  of  partial  prepayment  (half)  without  indenture.  Here,  we 
define the “natural rate of cooperation” as the rate of cooperation observed in a game where trust 
and reciprocity can give rise to cooperative behavior, but individuals can do better by unilaterally 
deviating. 
Section 2 presents the game and lays out the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the experiment. 
Section 4 reports the analysis. Section 5 discusses our results and concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical Background  
The  IG  is  a  three-stage  game,  following  Kritikos  and  Bolle  (1998).  Here,  two  parties  can 
potentially enter into trade, exchanging a service (by the agent) for a payment (by the principal). 
Principals and agents make non-binding agreements. Players cannot be forced to comply with the 
“agreement” (of course, the word “agreement” is a misnomer if only one party wishes to engage in 
trade). In stage 1, a principal can initiate a contract by indenturing a banknote of value e by tearing 
it in two. One part of the indentured banknote (the first half) is sent to the agent. Tearing the 
banknote into two renders both pieces worthless, when separated. The banknote regains its value 
only when the principal sends the agent the matching and second half (the completing half).
7 In 
stage  2,  the  agent  may  provide  or  refuse  to  provide  the  service.  Upon  refusal,  there  is  no 
“contract”, and the agent keeps b, the cost he incurs in providing the service, where b < e. In stage 
3, if the service is provided, the principal receives a, the value of the service to him, where a > e, 
and then decides whether to transfer or withhold the second part of the indentured banknote.
8 
Figure 1a describes the IG (figure 1b will be described in section 3). Node (*) can be replaced by 
                                                 
7 Kritikos and Bolle (1998) and Kritikos (2000) also discuss conditions under which agents expect to receive the 
second indenture from principal. 
8 For simplicity, variables such as investment, wage, effort or quality levels are not considered here. The service is an 
indivisible good, with a fixed quality known to both parties.   5 
(0,a) if one assumes that a principal does not play the altruistic strategy of offering the second 
half even without receiving the service.  This assumption is also tested with our experimental 
design.  
<Insert Figure 1 about here.> 
In the IG, in stage 1, the principal virtually “transfers his entire stake” (although only the first 
half is transferred, it no longer holds pecuniary value for him) to the agent (albeit the intermediate 
payment  in  hand  holds  no  pecuniary  value  to  the  agent).  In  the  final  stage,  the  principal  is 
indifferent  between  transferring  and  withholding  the  completing  half.  Next,  we  lay  out  our 
experimental hypotheses, considering both game theoretic and behavioral predictions. 
The Nash-equilibria are clearly identified by describing the strategies for both players. The 
principal can choose either to initiate a contract or not initiate it. If the principal initiates the 
contract, the agent then has the choice between providing and or refusing to provide the service. In 
the final stage, a principal who has initiated a contract has the choice between the following four 
strategies: (1) always transfer the second half regardless of the agent’s choice; (2) never transfer 
the second half regardless of the agent’s choice; (3) transfer the second half only if the agent had 
not provided the service, or; (4) transfer the second half only if the agent had provided the service. 
There is no unique equilibrium in the IG. Backward induction identifies four subgame-perfect 
equilibria. If the principal chooses strategy (4) it is a mutual best reply for both to take cooperative 
actions throughout the game. If the principal chooses any of the other three strategies, the best 
reply of the agent is to defect, and the principal is better off not initiating the contract (i.e. to 
choose the outside option). Now, allow us to consider an equilibrium refinement. 
Using forward induction as an equilibrium selection criterion (van Damme, 1989), the unique 
stable equilibrium of the game is one where both principal and agent cooperate. This follows 
because mutual cooperation leads to the only equilibrium in the IG that yields a strictly higher 
payoff to both players than the outside option.
9 Still, the outcome predicted by forward induction, 
notably, coincides with the outcome predicted by the interaction of reciprocal players – if and only 
if intrinsic incentives are not crowded out. Of course, we do not disregard the possibility that not 
only perfectly rational and selfish reasoning leads to full cooperation, if observed, but that it also 
can involve a mixture of motives driven by reciprocity, for example, in addition. 
H1: By forward induction and/or reciprocity (without any crowding out effect), all principals and 
agents will cooperate, i.e. all transactions will be completed.  
As spelt out above, the previous moves of players in stages prior to the final node can be 
interpreted differently, in terms of types and intentions. For example, a principal who sends a first 
indenture may later (in stage 3) send the second half if he is of the cooperative type, or withhold 
the  second  half  if  he  is  of  the  malicious  type.  Even  though  the  game  is  one  of  complete 
                                                 
9 In games with incomplete information about the “type” of the other player, it is an equilibrium move to cooperate if 
the expected profit of the cooperative action is higher than the outside option (cf. Kritikos and Bolle, 1998).    6 
information  on  payoffs,  in  terms  of  player  types  it  is  in  the  present  experiment  a  game  of 
incomplete information.  
In this stride, let us alternatively consider the behavioral argument that a player can behave 
based on the prior that some but not all co-players will cooperate (for a similar approach in the 
centipede  game,  see  McKelvey  and  Palfrey,  1992).  Consider  the  cost-benefit  ratios  for  each 
player. A risk neutral principal makes no offer at the first stage, if he expects a contract to be 
insufficiently profitable, i.e. if the perceived probability of meeting a cooperative agent is < e/a 
(with  a  being  the  principal’s  valuation  of  the  service),  i.e.,  the  probability  of  meeting  an 
uncooperative agent is > e/a. Likewise, a risk neutral agent will not cooperate, if the perceived 
probability  of  the  risk  neutral  agent  in  meeting  a  cooperative  (non-malicious)  principal  (who 
transfers the second half after receiving the service) is < b/e (with b being the agent’s valuation of 
the  service)  i.e.,  the  probability  of  meeting  an  malicious  principal  is  >  b/e.
10 Such  priors  are 
supported by the existence of a population distribution with players who do not apply forward 
induction reasoning. For this we may, instead of H1, opt for a weaker hypothesis.  
H2: The sufficiently high prior of a population distribution with uncooperative co-players result in 
defection (at stages 1 or 2). Cooperation increases with expected profits.  
Since we are concerned with the efficacy of indenture as a candidate contract design, we 
should  test  the  potential  variance  of  its  efficiency  under  different  parameter  values,  in  direct 
relations to its overall performance given a distribution of types. Considering the possibility that 
reciprocal  types  exist  (as is  shown  in  the  literature,  as  cited  above),  one  should  consider  the 
possibility  of  a  crowding  out  of  intrinsic  incentives  to  voluntary  cooperation.  The  method  of 
indenture attempts to circumvent this by endogenizing intrinsic incentives in the game structure. Is 
it effective in this respect? If we should indeed find a dominant proportion of reciprocal players 
with crowded out incentives, we should observe the following. Like in H2, the crowding out of 
intrinsic  incentives  results  in  less  than  full  cooperation.  However, unlike  H2,  the  relationship 
between expected profits from cooperation and the rate of cooperation should be negative (instead 
of positive). Whether indenture results in a positive or negative net effect depends on whether the 
effect of crowding out dominates. In this sense, we will observe what the dominant effect of 
indenture is for a given distribution of (selfish and reciprocal) types. This determines its efficacy 
and  so  its  appropriateness  under  different  conditions.  Such  understanding  can  be  useful,  for 
example, when the policymaker knows the distribution of player types. 
Related to this, we might expect agents to refuse contracts simply on the basis that principals 
are getting more out of a completed contract. Envy, in connection to inequity aversion (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), predicts such a result. Our experiment attempts to 
disentangle such confounds, using an appropriate set of parameterizations, as elaborated below. 
Kritikos and Bolle (2001) investigate this issue of efficiency and equity concerns in greater detail. 
                                                 
10 The limit a/e holds for the case that the principal does not choose the so-called “perverse strategy”, i.e. that he 
offers the second indenture only if the agent does not transfer the service. To exclude such strategies seems to be 
plausible. Otherwise, the probability of meeting a “perverse” principal needs to be added to a/e. See Kritikos and 
Bolle (1998).   7 
We may formulate the following alternative hypothesis. 
H2’: The crowding out of intrinsically motivated reciprocal players due to extrinsic incentives 
results in defection (at stages 1 or 2). Cooperation decreases with expected profits if this effect 
dominates, i.e., if the proportion of “crowded out” reciprocal types is sufficiently large.  
Next, we turn to consider the effect and performance of indenture over time. If one assumes 
that  subjects  do  not  play  by  the  concept  of  forward  induction,  perhaps  because  of  bounded 
rationality, such effects can disappear with time. By repeating a game (even with different co-
players), one may learn the equilibrium play, as well as update their priors of the distribution of 
player types. Learning the equilibrium strategy leads to the eventual attainment of H1. Related to 
this is the concept of strategy adaptation based on previous experiences. The likelihood of playing 
a strategy is strengthened by past experiences where it paid off (Roth and Erev, 1995). Overall 
cooperation rates can increase (decrease) if players have past experiences of cooperative actions 
resulting in positive (negative) outcomes, i.e., when co-players cooperated (defected).  
H3: Given time, cooperation increases (decreases) if past cooperative actions resulted in positive 
(negative) outcomes (or they learn to play the forward induction equilibrium). 
As a working hypothesis, to test if indenture works well, we should ideally have support for 
H4: The rate of completed contracts in the IG should be higher than the natural cooperation rate. 
 
3.  Experimental Procedure 
The experimental game closely follows that described above. It is therefore a direct test of H1. In 
the  experiment,  the  principals  received  specimen  banknotes,  and  agents  received  vouchers 
indicating the value of their service. These were all placed, collected and redistributed (to the 
relevant subject) in envelopes, thus maintaining privacy and anonymity. We fixed e = 20; each 
principal was provided with a “DM 20 banknote”. Principals and agents played IG’s varying in 
values for the service. The treatments differed according to the following parameters for IG(a,b): 
IG(30,10), IG(25,5), IG(25,15), and IG(40,15). These variations allow us to test the behavioral 
considerations  underlying  H2  and  H2’,  and  also  the  inequity  aversion  hypothesis,  if  behavior 
deviates from H1, i.e. full cooperation.  
Parameters  differed  across  sessions,  and  kept  constant  within  sessions  (between-subject 
design).  Principals  received  no  refunds  for  indentures  made  to  agents  refusing  service:  doing 
otherwise would likely result in a deluge of “risk-free” cooperative actions by principals. The 
game  had  complete  information  on  payoffs.  The  same  game  was  repeated  seven  times,  with 
random  and  anonymous  pair  wise  re-matching  in  each  round.
11 The  number  of  periods  was 
announced  at  the  beginning  of  each  session.  Subjects  received  feedback  on  the  actions  and 
outcomes relevant to their pair wise match. This procedure preserves independence across rounds 
and the one-shot nature of tasks. It allows us to test H3, without unnecessary confounds from 
reputation and supergame effects. 
                                                 
11 Even with 7 rounds we get very lucid results for behavior over time.   8 
To test H4, we added a control treatment, CG, to benchmark the natural rate of cooperation. 
This game (Figure 1b) was parameterized so that the gains from cooperation, compared across the 
initial and terminal nodes, is similar to IG(30,10). Here principals have no access to indenture. 
Instead, the principal can transfer a prepayment (of half the pecuniary value of total payment – not 
half the fiduciary document) to the agent when initializing the contract, and the second half upon 
delivery of the service. Once again, IG and CG are similar in that no party is forced to honor their 
dues  (i.e.,  payment  upon  service,  or  service  upon  payment).  In  the  CG,  however,  the  unique 
equilibrium by backward induction is that the principal chooses not to initiate the contract right 
from stage 1 (Rosenthal, 1982). The predictions in both games differ: CG therefore serves as a 
useful control. First, it shows us whether there indeed exists heterogeneity of types (in particular, 
selfish and reciprocal types). Second, the only thing we vary, moving from CG to IG, is the access 
to indenture – this affects payoffs and in turn equilibrium predictions. Given equal values in the 
goods to be traded, what is the effect of indenture? Related to this, we can disentangle the non-
monetary motives of cooperation (trust and reciprocity) in both IG and CG, from the monetary 
incentives unique to the IG. Payoffs differ in nodes other than the uncooperative strategy in the 
initial  node  and  the  cooperative  strategy  in  the  final  node.  Thus,  its  primary  purpose  is  for 
benchmarking performance in terms of natural rate of completed contracts, and on a game-by-
game level rather than stage-by-stage behavior. It also allows us to control for “goodwill” effects 
(a concept underlying relational contracts) from indenture in the IG, as also implemented by the 
prepayment in the CG.
12 
The experiment was conducted in the European University Viadrina, Germany. A total of 160 
undergraduates participated, with 32 subjects in each of the five sessions. Subjects were recruited 
via verbal and written announcements. Upon arrival, the subjects were randomly assigned roles as 
principals or agents. Roles remained unchanged throughout the session. There were 16 principals 
and 16 agents in each session. Subjects were placed in two separate rooms, depending on role. 
Instructions  were  read  aloud  to  inform  subjects  of  the  uniformity  of  tasks.  They  were  also 
provided with these instructions on a printed sheet. The appendix contains, using the case of the 
IG(30,10) principal as, an example of the decision sheet. Neutral language was used to avoid 
framing effects. Before making decisions, subjects answered control questions in order to ensure 
understanding. The session started after all subjects had given correct answers. Two agents and 
two principals were randomly chosen to receive payments at the end of each period. The average 
payoff per subject was about 13 Euros; each session lasted 60-90 minutes. 
 
4.  Results 
Primary results. Table 1 provides an overview of the observed behavior. In stage 1, principals 
decided  to  offer  contracts  by  sending  the  first  half  of  the  indenture  to  their  potential  trading 
partners in 94% of all cases. For stage 2, agents who were offered a contract accepted it, and 
                                                 
12 This control is similar in nature to the games mentioned in note 5, but design of the experiments are different in 
terms of stages and payoffs and, thus, cannot serve the purpose of a comparable control treatment in this investigation.   9 
delivered the service, in 88% of all cases. A high proportion of principals and agents mutually 
agree on a contract. In stage 3, principals who had received the service completed the contract by 
transferring the completing half in 97% of all cases. Completed transactions were observed in 
79% of all the games played. H1 receives strong support both on the levels of individual stages 
and entire games. The behavior observed in stage 3 is in line with theories of other-regarding 
behavior. Perfectly selfish principals, at this stage, would be indifferent between transferring and 
withholding the completing half. Nevertheless, almost all principals transfer the completing half, 
suggesting that social preferences (e.g. reciprocity and efficiency concerns) can serve as good 
tiebreakers in such cases of indifference, if it was not already pre-meditated at the first stage. Most 
importantly, the observed behavior supports the forward induction solution, and efficacy of the IG. 
<Insert Table 1 about here.> 
We now analyze possible explanations for why full cooperation was not observed. 
Strategic concerns. Table 2 compares the perceived probability threshold of meeting a non-
cooperative co-player required for a cooperative action to be chosen, and the observed cooperation 
rates, in each role.  
As to the agents, the number of contracts accepted by them decreased from 96% in IG(25,5), 
to 88% in IG(30,10), 85% in IG(40,15), and 81% in IG(25,15). Agents do not accept contracts 
simply based on the (possible) signal sent by the indenture. Our data also reveals that the profit 
margin (i.e., the revenue relative to the value of the service) reduces the agent’s willingness to 
transfer the service, even though cooperation is a best-reply (see correlation presented below).  
We test if inequity aversion is able to explain the differing behavior of the agents, or more 
specifically whether envy for the higher profit of the principal might have induced the agent to be 
less  cooperative  in  some  games  than  in  others.  We  disentangle  the  effect  of  differing  profit 
margins (mentioned above) from effects attributable to envy (if there is any) using the following 
comparisons. From the agent’s point-of-view the principal earns more in the IG(40,15) than in the 
IG(25,15),  while  the  agent’s  payoff  is  kept  constant  here.  If  agents  should  have  made  their 
decision also on the basis of envy, they should refuse more often in the former than the latter. We 
find no significant difference (z = –0.59, n.s., 2-tailed) between both conditions in terms of the 
rates  of  cooperation  in  stage  2  per  subject  (average  across  all  rounds  per  subject  as  one 
independent observation). Along the same lines of argument, from the point-of-view that the agent 
earns more in the IG(25,5) than the IG(25,15), relative to the principal’s payoff (kept constant 
here), an agent should be more envious and therefore refuse less often in the former than the latter. 
A Mann Whitney U test finds refusals more prevalent in the IG(25,5) than the IG(25,15) (z = –
2.07, p < 0.05), being in counter-support for H2’ (i.e. the opposite result to that predicted by 
envy). This observation implies that the expected profits story is more convincing in our context. 
The  probability  of  an  agent  offering  the  service  increases  with  the  (expected)  profit  margin 
providing support for H2 with respect to agents. 
<Insert Table 2 about here>   10 
Similarly, we may expect that, in stage 1, the probability that principals initiate contracts 
increase with their own profit margin. The rate of contracts offered rose from 88% in IG(25,15), to 
89% in IG(30,10), and 99% in IG(40,15). This relationship, however, does not hold for IG(25,5) 
where we observe 100% of principals offering contracts; it should in this case have a similar 
cooperation rate as IG(25,15) – but it does not.  
A possible explanation is as follows. In the IG(25,5) the perceived probability threshold for 
agents to not cooperate is low. In turn, the probability of agents unwilling to cooperate is low. The 
Spearman correlation between b/e and the (average per subject) cooperation rate for agents across 
treatments  is  negative  and  significant  (r  =  –0.27,  p  <  0.05,  1-tailed).  For  a  sufficiently  high 
perceived probability of meeting a malicious principal, the expected profits from cooperation must 
also be sufficiently high to encourage cooperation by agents. Cooperation rates are negatively 
correlated  with  risks,  and  conversely  speaking,  positively  correlated  with  potential  profits. 
Principals,  anticipating  this  and  being  the  first  movers,  had  good  reasons  to  always  offer  a 
contract.
13 The Spearman correlation between e/a and the (average per subject) cooperation rate 
for principals across treatments is insignificant (r = –0.08, n.s.). H2, with respect to principals, has 
to be considered together with their anticipation of how agents will respond to the indenture, given 
an agent’s expectation of meeting a malicious principal and the potential profit from trade. The 
principal’s  strategic  position  allows  for  such  anticipations  to  be  used  in  the  decision-making 
process. To test this extended hypothesis, we simply restrict the sample by considering all cases 
except  IG(25,5).  There  is  a  positive  and  significant  correlation  between  the  e/a  and  average 
principal cooperation rates (r = –0.25, p < 0.05). We find support for this extended hypothesis. In 
turn,  it  provides  support  for  anticipation  and  backward  induction  reasoning,  beyond  cases 
explainable by forward induction.  
Over  time.  Adaptive  individuals  will  continue  using  a  strategy  if  this  strategy  yielded  a 
positive outcome when used in the past. Strategies may be revised if negative outcomes result. For 
a principal who initiated a contract, the outcome is determined by whether the agent offered the 
service. For this, we use a binary logistic regression of the probability of offering a contract in a 
current  round,  on  whether  offering  a  contract  in  a  previous  round  led  to  a  service  (LWork), 
controlling  for  round  (Round).  Table  3  shows  that  for  principals,  Round  coefficients  are 
insignificant for all treatments. Cooperation rates are stable over time. For principals in IG(30,10) 
and  IG(25,15),  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  a  “cooperative”  experience  (i.e.,  the 
contracts they initiated resulted in a service provided by the agent) in the previous round and a 
cooperative action in the current round. There is no such relationship for IG(40,15) and IG(25,5) 
since cooperation rates are close to full. Conversely, cooperation in a previous round resulting in a 
negative experience (the agent shirked) discourages a principal from cooperating in the current 
round. These results support H3. 
<Insert Table 3 about here.> 
                                                 
13 There were only four cases where agents did not cooperate. In their comments, principals criticized this behavior as 
incomprehensible and thus continued to offer contracts.   11 
An  agent’s  outcome  (LPaid)  is  determined  by  whether  the  principal  completed  the 
payment, if a service was provided, or if the service was not provided. We use a binary logistic 
regression of the probability of offering the service in a current round, on whether offering a 
service or otherwise in a previous round led to full payment, controlling for round. Table 3 shows 
that for agents, cooperation rates are stable across time, and there is a no relationship between 
experiences in the previous round and behavior in the current round. The explanation for why our 
tests detected no experience-based behavior by agents is simple: those who worked almost always 
received the completing half (97%). In no cases did it pay to shirk after first-indentures had been 
received – completing halves were never transferred in such cases.
14
 See also previous subsection 
“Strategic concerns”: agents base behavior on the scenario at hand, i.e. parameters and principals 
signals/moves as and when inferable. 
Performance. Figure 2 shows that IG(30,10) performs about as well as the CG in the first 
round, but way better over time and in the final round in terms of completed contracts. The rate of 
completed contracts increases from 0.69 to 0.88 in IG(30,10) (mean 0.76), while it decreases from 
0.63 to 0.06 (mean of 0.36) in the CG. Mann Whitney U tests find the difference in initial round 
completed contract rates insignificant (z = –0.37, n.s., 2-tailed), while the differences between 
conditions in  terms  of  final  round  cooperation  (z  =  –4.53,  p  <  0.001)  and  overall  completed 
contract rates (where the average of completed contracts per principal is taken as one independent 
observation) is significant (z = –3.86, p < 0.001). Binary logistic regressions capture the evolution 
of behavior over time for CG and IG(30,10).
15 Cooperation rates decay in the CG over time (–
0.24, p < 0.05) – in stark contrast to the stable rates in the IG over time (0.10, n.s.). We find strong 
evidence for H4, and further, significantly more stability of cooperation over time in the IG.  
<Insert Figure 2 about here.> 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper shows that high cooperation rates can be achieved when a contract is designed as an 
IG,  even  in  a  one-shot  environment  where  reputation  does  not  count.  Cooperation  rates  are 
significantly higher than natural cooperation rates overall and in the final round – its stability over 
time further makes it an attractive policy or contract tool. The transfer of an indentured banknote 
in return for an agent’s service is an incentive-compatible enforcement device. Agents realized 
that their mutual best reply in this game is to cooperate and thus offered the requested service, 
while principals anticipating this transferred the first half of the indenture.  
The extent to which the IG is effective increases with the potential profits an agent can derive 
from cooperating. For principals, it is not as straightforward. Their strategic position allows them 
to play a dictatorial role, albeit “benevolent” as reflected in our data. Knowing that the agent can 
stand to gain more, principals were convinced that sending the first half is a safe move; their 
                                                 
14 Some agents commented that they wanted to test whether they would receive the second part of the indenture 
without offering the service since half the indenture was useless for the principal. However, all principals refrained 
from indulging such opportunistic agents. This underlines that the reciprocal/best-reply strategy is used in both ways.
 
15 We do not analyze stage-by-stage behavior, due to the difference in payoff relations, as explained in section 3.   12 
potential profits, although relatively low, will be gained with a high probability. This can be 
attributed to the high degree of strategic “complementarity”, which cuts both ways. An agent 
should cooperate as and when a principal offers a contract. Likewise, a principal who considers 
the agent’s high potential gains from cooperation can expect his offer to be accepted with a high 
probability. In the other cases, a principal’s readiness to cooperate was observed to increase with 
potential profit. Considering this point, one should be cautious when applying the IG to cases 
where the potential gain of an agent might be very low, relative to his cost, as refusals by agents to 
accept contracts might give rise to losses suffered by principals upon “let-down” (and in turn, 
efficiency losses result). Another method to circumvent this problem is by providing social history 
of previous interactions, such as a “track record”, to signal reputation. 
“Learning”  also  played  a  role  in  the  adaptation  of  strategies  over  time,  in  particular  for 
principals.  Cooperation  rates  for  both  principals  and  agents  were  stable  over  time.  Principals 
continued cooperating when agents fulfilled their roles in providing the service. Principals became 
cautious when agents shirked. Some agents shirked after receiving the first half, perhaps to test 
principals’ unconditional altruism, but such strategies were not rewarded. After learning that there 
is no positive response to the opportunistic strategy, agents should revise their strategies to that of 
cooperation thereafter. This self-governing process thus circumvents much moral hazard due to 
the  exploitation  of  other-regarding  types  in  relational  contracts.  It  performs  far  better  in 
comparison with the natural rate observed in the control treatment.  
On another note, a critic could argue that the observed cooperation is due not only to incentive 
compatibility,  because  the  forward  induction  outcome  coincides  with  behavior  due  to  social 
preferences such as reciprocity.16 We do not dispute this, and have tested the extent to which 
introducing extrinsic incentives to a population with reciprocal players might result in possible 
negative effects (via crowding out), which in turn diminishes the efficacy of indenture. In our 
case, the IG has proven to be an effective solution for both selfish and reciprocal players. Insofar 
as there exists reciprocally driven players, we have not observed strong evidence indicating any 
form of “crowding out” of intrinsic incentives. In contrast, cooperation increased with the amount 
of extrinsic incentives provided. The IG endogenizes intrinsic motivation in extrinsic incentives, 
by implementing commitment with the first half as trust, and payment with the completing half as 
reciprocity. To this effect, some principals and agents cooperate, in words of Frey (1997), “not 
just for the money”. Further, it also works for the others who cooperate just for the money. 
To conclude, this experiment provides strong evidence that individuals can be induced to 
cooperate when indenture can temporally delay incentives, ex ante serving as a commitment to 
follow through with payment-upon-delivery. This suggests further consideration for the potential 
of using the method of indenture to complement the design of contracts in future work. 
 
                                                 
16 Similar  results  are  found  even  with  no  such  “coincidence”,  e.g.  Brandts  and  Holt  (1992),  as  corroborated by 
applications of forward induction to the Battle of the Sexes (e.g. Cooper et al., 1993; Brandts and Holt, 1995). van 
Huyck et al. (1993) found similar support when the outside option was auctioned; the outcome of the outside option is 
thus endogenized. For a related discussion of Forward Induction in experimental games, see Ochs (1995).   13 
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Table 1  Mean Cooperation Rates 
 
 




Table 3  Binary Logistic Regressions on the Probability of Cooperating* 
* Significance at the 0.1(0.05)[0.01] level (2-tailed for comparability) is denoted by *(**)[***].  
 
Treatment  e/a  Stage 1  b/e  Stage 2 
IG(25,15)  0.80  0.88  0.75  0.81 
IG(40,15)  0.50  0.99  0.75  0.85 
IG(30,10)  0.67  0.89  0.50  0.88 
IG(25,5)  0.80  1.00  0.25  0.96 
 
Treatment     Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3  Completed 
IG(30,10)  Mean  0.89  0.88  0.97  0.76 
  N  112  100  88  112 
  S.D.  0.31  0.33  0.18  0.43 
IG(40/15)  Mean  0.99  0.85  0.97  0.81 
  N  112  111  94  112 
  S.D.  0.09  0.36  0.18  0.39 
IG(25,15)  Mean  0.88  0.81  0.94  0.66 
  N  112  98  79  112 
  S.D.  0.33  0.40  0.25  0.48 
IG(25,5)  Mean  0.99  0.96  1.00  0.95 
  N  112  111  106  112 
  S.D.  0.09  0.21  0.00  0.23 
Total  Mean  0.94   0.87   0.97   0.79  
  N  448  420  367  448 
    S.D.  0.24   0.33   0.17   0.40  
 
Stage 1  IG(30,10)    IG(40,15)    IG(25,15)    IG(25,5)    Total   
Constant  1.42     25.32    0.75    128.54    1.93  * 
Round  0.02     -0.72    0.06    -15.33    -0.03   
LWork  1.34  *  -17.13    2.13  ***  -18.72    1.74  *** 
-2LogLikelihood  41.55    9.77    42.12    7.05    116.38   
Stage 2   IG(30,10)   IG(40,15)   IG(25,15)  IG(25,5)    Total   
Constant  20.56    1.94    21.04    9.87  ***  2.61   
Round  0.22    -0.21    0.04    -1.19  **  -0.09   
LPaid  -19.32    0.95    -19.59    -    0.03   
-2LogLikelihood  38.43    63.03    48.63    25.71    189.15   




Instructions for K 
Password:........                Pseydonym:........... 
You take part in an experiment between two parties, named V and K. A person V has a stamp to 
which he assigns a value of DM 10. A person K assigns a value of DM 30 to the same stamp. Both 
agree that V will sell the stamp to K at a price of DM 20. 
 
You are K!               Your number is ...... 
 
Step 1 
You may (but you do not have to) tear the banknote in two parts and transfer half of it to V. If you 
keep your banknote, the exchange is over. If you tear the banknote and transfer one part of it to V, 
the exchange goes on: 
 
Step 2 
V may (but does not have to) send you his/her stamp. 
 
Step 3 
You may (but you do not have to) send the second part of the banknote to V. 
 
If you have a complete banknote of DM 20, you are entitled to DM 20. If you have the stamp you 
are entitled to DM 30. If V has the stamp, he/she is entitled to DM 10. 
 
In each group 2 participants will be randomly chosen to receive the appropriate payment. 